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Summixis, Spermata and Nous: Anaxagoras’
pluralistic Ontology
Claudia Rosciglione
1. Summixis, Spermata, Mixture and Dissociation: beyond
Parmenides’ Monism
The aim of this paper is to construe Anaxagoras’ thought as a form
of Philosophy of Nature which, unlike Parmenides’, admits of the
coming-to-be and the passing-away which are meant as the continuous
mixture and dissociation of the matter the natural world consists of.
Consequently, I will emphasize the naturalistic and anti-mythological
character of Anaxagoras’ thought.
To be sure, Anaxagoras stood in direct continuity with the Mile-
sian thinkers. Nonetheless, he proceeded beyond them arguing for a
pluralistic ontology that can be described by the analysis of such key
concepts as summixis, spermata and nous. Accordingly, Anaxagoras
is ascribed a dierent stance than Parmenides. As Parmenides main-
tained a monistic and static concept of reality, Anaxagoras allowed
instead the possibility of plurality, change and motion in the world.
In this paper, I will point out the imperishable character of the
matter that derives from Anaxagoras’ theory of the coming-to-be and
the passing-away, of mixture and dissociation. Indeed, it can be shown
that the matter is bound not to disappear, that is to pass away, just
because of this process of mixture and dissociation of the multitude of
parts it is composed of. This imperishable character of the matter, or
more appropriately of What Is, could be regarded as a feature that is
common both to Anaxagoras’ and Parmenide’s thought, but according
to Parmenides What Is is the Being that is identical to itself and still,
while according to Anaxagoras What Is is the plurality of ingredients
which continuously mix and separate one another by means of motion.1
In the fragment no. 4DK, Anaxagoras refers to a “mixture of all
things”, in which no colour is distinguishable, while in everything there
1. There are many other opposite interpretations of Anaxagoras’ thought accor-
ding to which the philosopher from Clazomene owes very much to Parmenides. See
for instance: Calogero 1967; Gomperz 1933; Zeller e Mondolfo 1969.
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is a share of everything. It is an original mixture that is endowed with a
pluralistic nature just for its being a summixis as such. This plurality is
original too, and it is preserved in all the things-that-are which indeed
amount to as many composites. Therefore, What Is eternally is just
this “mixture of all things” which is pluralistic by nature. Burnet and
Conford attempted to solve the problem arguing that all things in all
meant that every seed contains a portion of every opposite; Raven
postulated an innite number of spermata, each containing a portion
(moira) of everything; Reesor believed that the phrase "everything
in everything" can be interpreted by Anaxagoras’ doctrine that there
was not a smallest. Silvestre holds instead that if one assumes a more
comprehensive meaning of the term moira, that is to say that of “part”,
then moira may stand for both the single seed, which is the component
of the thing (krema), and the group of the homogeneous seeds, which
identify the thing and qualify it as a whole.2
Even assuming that it can be unclear how to Anaxagoras in eve-
rything there should be a share of everything, as one can deduce
from the variety of the interpretations, it is possible anyway to claim
that the argument of an original summixis clearly articulates a plura-
listic conceptualization of the cosmos which is never questioned by
Anaxagoras.
On this ground, I agree with Gomperz who denes the summixis
a sort of original chaos that bears as such the character of plurality.3
Anaxagoras’ imperishable matter corresponds to the collection of ma-
nifold, dierent elements, which is originally indistiguishable, and it
is just for this reason that it can be said chaotic. Starting from this
point of view, one can claim that this chaotic summixis is completely
dierent from both Parmenides’ Being and Anaximander’s apeiron.
Actually, Anaximander’s apeiron is indeterminate, undierentiated,
and homogeneous, but it is not a summixis, hence it lacks the character
of plurality that Anaxagoras ascribed to the original matter. On this
ground, I disagree with Aristotle’s interpretation that is inclined to ne-
glect the dierence between Anaxagoras’ summixis and Anaximander’s
apeiron. As far as Anaxagoras’ thought is concerned, Aristotle uses the
2. Cf. Burnet 1920, 263-264; Cornford 1930; Raven 1954; Reesor 1960;
Silvestre 1988, 217.
3. Cf. Gomperz 1896-1909. On this issue cf. also Sisko 2010, 449 f.
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term “one” as more suitable than such expression as “all things were
together”.4 But Aristotle seems to fail to take notice that Anaxagoras
used just the term summixis, which unlike “one” means just a collection
of manifold things. It is just this meaning that allows Anaxagoras to
claim the pluralistic nature of the cosmos upon which – as I maintain
– all his thought is based. Therefore, the argument that it is a sound to
talk in terms of “one” rather than summixis for both Anaxagoras and
Anaximander can be regarded as an incongruous interpretation that
does not take into account the terms manifestly used by Anaxagoras
and what they are intended to mean. By denition, the mixture is
just the opposite in meaning to “the one”. It denotes the mixing of
something and implies the plurality that is not a constitutive feature of
“the one”, which is meant instead as an ungenerated and uncorrupted
metaphysical principle (archè) that rules every thing.
Actually, the fact that Anaximander is the rst thinker who talks
about the archè and identies it with the apeiron allows Aristotle to
construe this principle in a metaphysical sense. It is the rst cause
that is not caused, an ungenerated and uncorrupted principle which
depends on no other principle. Rather it is the principle of all things.5
According to this view, the apeiron transcends all things of which it is
a principle and by which it can not be corrupted. Then, the dierence
between the apeiron and Anaxagoras’ summixis can be outlined so that
it becomes more and more clear-cut. The summixis is not segregated
from the things that arise in nature. On the contrary, it is the material
ground upon which all things take shape as composites of the original
ingredients, which in the mixture are not distinct from one another
until the motion brings about their distinction and distribute them in
various ways, hence giving rise to dierent things. The qualities, the
properties are immanent and constitutive features of the things because
they are physically present in the things themselves. Therefore there is
no dierence between things and qualities in Anaxagoras’ thoroughly
physicalist view.6
4. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica, XII, 2, 1069 b 20-24.
5. Cf. Aristotle, Physica III, 4, 203 b 4-15.
6. As far as this issue is concerned, Meinwald states that "Anaxagoras thought
of the basic constituents as having the very qualities they contributed to composites.
Thus the Hot – the totality of heat in the world – was itself hot"(Meinwald 1992).
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In the same fragment no. 4DK, Anaxagoras claims that “there are
many dierent things present in everything that is being combined ”,
and calls spermata the many things, whereof there is a share in every
composite. In my view in Anaxagoras’ cosmology it is not important
whether such spermata are atomic or not,7 rather the fact that they
represent within the summixis just the diversity and the multiplicity
that make the mixture a composite, an aggregate instead of a unity.
Therefore, the summixis is never cancelled in the process that
gives shape to things. Rather, it is maintained by being realized in the
things that are distinct from one another. This distinction is due to
the higher concentration of some ingredients of which every thing
is composed, as Anaxagoras spells out at the end of the fragment no.
12DK.8 Hence, what prevails allows to distinguish the things from
one another, although these things continue to be a plurality and a
multitude of ingredients.
Accordingly, to this view all that which exists has the properties of
unity and homogeneity, because of its being a plurality of ingredients,
that is a composite in which motion causes some ingredients to pre-
vail over the others, thus making every composite dierent from one
another.
It is the reason that induced Anaxagoras to claim that although
things dier, they are neither separated out nor completely detached
from one another since they are mixtures endowed with a pluralistic na-
ture. The distinction of things is only a matter of the predominance or
of the dierent organisation of the ingredients that constitute them. On
the other hand, the process of shaping things is never ultimately accom-
plished, and that allows the continuous motion, that is the becoming,
to occur since there is actually no coming-to-be and passing-away,
rather a process of mixing and separation of the ingredients.
As far this question is concerned, the reference is obviously to be
made to the fragment no. 17DK, in which Anaxagoras charges the
7. There are indeed many scholars who reject the atomistic interpretation that
the spermata are divisible bodily particles. See for instance: Cornford 1930, 14-30
and 83-95; Burnet 1920; Mondolfo 1970, 105; Gigon 1936, 14 f.
8. Reesor said that "The particularization of the entity was dermined by the com-
ponens which predominated. The components wich determinated the individuality of
the entity predominated over all other component entities" (Cf. Reesor 1960, 7).
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Greeks with not thinking correctly what the coming-to-be (ghinestai)
and the passing-away (appollustai) actually are. According to him, no
thing is actually born and then dies, rather everything takes part in
mixing-together (summisgestai) and dissociating (diakrinestai). There-
fore, the coming-to-be and the passing-away should be more correctly
called the being mixed together and the being dissociated.
I will now try to connect what Anaxagoras claims in this fragment
to what he maintained about the summixis and the relationship it
holds with the things-that-are as composites that preserve the original
mixture and turn it into an arrangement. This connection allows giving
an interpretation of Anaxagoras according to which his thought owes
nothing to Parmenides. On the contrary, it can be argued that he
developed a thought which is opposite to Parmenides, who ruled out
the coming-to-be and the passing-away to state the motionless and
unitary character of Being. Instead, Anaxagoras ruled out the coming-
to-be and the passing-away only inasmuch as they are not correctly
understood as the continuous mixture and dissociation of the matter.
Let us grant that Anaxagoras admitted of Parmenides’ principle
that whatever is, is (being) and whatever is not, is not (notbeing),
according to which to talk of what is not yields a contradiction, since
the characteristics of existence would be ascribed to what is not. It is
not coincidence that according to this view Anaxagoras talked about
an eternal matter, hence of a cosmos which neither begins nor ends.
This argument does not compel Anaxagoras to admit of the de-
nial of the manifold and plurality of the things-that-are and, above all,
the dualistic opposition between the Being and the Notbeing. Indeed,
in Parmenides’ view the Notbeing corresponds fairly to the plurali-
ty that Anaxagoras ascribed to the things-that-are and hence to the
Being, as the interpretation of this paper maintains. Therefore, the
closeness between Anaxagoras and Parmenides can be restricted only
to the agreement on the logical reasoning that the existence can not
be ascribed to what is not. In Anaxagoras’ view, there is no oppo-
sition between the unperishable, unique and motionless Being and
the Notbeing which entails the contrary, that is the coming-to-be, the
passing-away, the becoming, the multitude, the motion. According to
such a dynamical construal, what is not does not correspond to the
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Notbeing, that is to what is not, rather it amounts to being something
else, that is something which is dierent from that thing which is.9
I suggest that in the fragment no. 17DK the aim of Anaxagoras
is on the one hand to claim and preserve the imperishable character
of the original matter, by denying the coming-to-be and the passing-
away, and on the other to maintain the summixis, which characterizes
the original matter, along with the plurality, the motion, the diver-
sity, which all characterizes the cosmos, by defending the concepts
of mixture and the dissociation. According to this interpretation of
fragment no. 17DK, as opposed to Parmenides’ thought, the cosmology
of Anaxagoras is based on an original matter which is itself dynamic
and plural. If that is the case, the fragment no. 17DK should not be
construed anymore as it articulated the belief in Parmenides’ view of
the Being and the Notbeing. On the contrary, Anaxagoras could be
acknowledged to introduce really an innovative argument, because he
claims a pluralistic view of the ontology and the becoming so that to
avoid the logical contradiction laid bare by Parmenides.
When he defends the mixture, the dissociation and the motion,
Anaxagoras ascribes to the Being just those characteristics which Par-
menides ascribed to the Notbeing and to which he consequently denied
the existence. The opposition between the Being and the Notbeing
holds no more from the standpoint that regards the natural world as
a collection of composites which change and transform continuously
according to the principle of the predominance of the original and
imperishable ingredients of the summixis.
Furthermore, the question can not be eluded about whether a
Parmenidean construal of the meaning of the fragment no. 17DK would
be consistent with the claims of other fragments of great importance
such as the 4DK, the 12DK, and so on. If Anaxagoras would have
meant to arm the Parmenidean Being, by denying any existence
to the becoming, the change and the plurality, why should he have
talked elsewhere in terms of original mixture, composites, motion of
the original ingredients? It is more reasonable that since the beginning
Anaxagoras meant to arm a pluralistic and dynamic view of the
cosmos, and accordingly that the fragment no. 17DK articulates such
9. Cf. Furley 2002.
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a Weltanschauung by taking into account just Parmenides’ logical
argument about what is and what is not.
This interpretation brings more the argument of the mixture and
the dissociation to the fore than the argument of denying the coming-
to-be and the passing-away, implying that the becoming is not ruled
out rather explained by the original summixis that is set in motion by
the nous.
I maintain that Anaxagoras can be reasonably ascribed the view
that the matter is imperishable. Indeed, the matter is bound not to
disappear, that is to pass away, but it keeps on living through the
continuous process of mixing and dissociating of the manifold parts it
is composed of.
The thought of Anaxagoras outlines a Philosophy of Nature that is
founded on the primacy of such a unity that derives from multiplicity
in opposition to a motionless and undivided unity.
Hence, Anaxagoras’ thought exemplies a logic that opposes Par-
menides, since everything exists just by means of what to Parmenides
is what is not, that is the becoming that derives from the motion of the
multitude of ingredients which things are composed of. The matter
is imperishable because it is an arrangement, that is it binds die-
rent ingredients that kept endlessly on moving and never come to be
ultimately separated out or detached from one another.
Therefore, all that Parmenides conceived of as the world of Not-
being, of illusion and ignorance changes into what Anaxagoras claims
instead to be the foundation of Being: the original mixture, the mixing
and the dissociating, the motion. According to this construal of Ana-
xagoras’ thought, the unity is not so much opposed to the multiplicity
as it is rather derived from the multiciplicity as well as from the conti-
nuous process of unication and separation of elements of which the
natural matter is made.
The commitment to the multiplicity and the becoming does not
imply ruling out the unity. Instead, that means a dierent understan-
ding of what unity actually is, that is the organisation that arises out
of the continuous mixture, which from being undierentiated turns
into being a particular composite that is distinguished from others.
Spermata are what the original mixture as well as the distinct composi-
tes preserve. In the fragment no. 4DK, Anaxagoras claims that “many
dierent things present in everything that is being combined and seeds
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of all things”. Spermata are the manifold ingredients of which the
imperishable matter is made. They are originally undierentiated in
the summixis, but by means of the motion, which is imparted on the
mixture by the nous, they turns into composites that are distinguishable
from one another, even though nothing ever comes to be ultimately
separated out or detached from anything else.
As I suggested above, in the fragment no. 12DK Anaxagoras claims
that the process that gives shape to things is never ultimately ac-
complished. This means that the things change continuously their
shape, because they transform since the rate varies continuously at
which various ingredients combine in them according to the princi-
ple of predominance. It is the reason that justies Anaxagoras’ claim
that the Greeks are wrong in talking about the coming-to-be and the
passing-away, because it is only a matter of mixing and dissociating
the ingredients, the spermata which are the original matter.
These arguments suggest the innovative and complex view of the
natural world as something that is caught in continuous motion and
is brought to life through transformation, which is not an obscure
or unexplainable notion since it amounts to the emergence and the
submergence of ingredients in relation to one another that take place
within the various composites.10 Every thing takes shape as a com-
posite, as it stems from the relations that their constitutive dierent
ingredients hold with one another. Any constitutive ingredient of a
composite owes its existence to the relation to the other ingredients
and is constrained by it. This is the meaning that according to my
interpretation should be ascribed to the fragment no. 3DK where Ana-
xagoras claims that “Nor of the small is there a smallest, but always
a smaller (for what-is cannot not be) — but also of the large there is
always a larger”. The large and the small are not as such absolutely,
rather always in relation to another thing which on its turn can be
either larger or smaller.
The natural world seems consequently to be a relational dynamic
system whose fundamental entities are not always the same and do not
obey always the same function, which instead can vary according to
the context and the composite they are going to shape. As Anaxagoras
10. Cf. Curd 2007.
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claims that things are never separated out form one another in this
single unique cosmos,11 it ensues that there must not exist an ultimate
and permanent reality which is always identical to itself. The original
ingredients, the spermata, are the material elements that constitute
this single unique cosmos, but their nature varies accordingly as the
predominance and their relations to one another vary. Finally, I suggest
that the well-known Anaxagoras’ principle that “in everything there
is a share of everything” too should be interpreted within this concep-
tual framework.12 If everything as well as the original ingredients are
related to all the other things-that-are, any new thing which is given a
shape amounts to a transformation of a preceding thing whose relation
of predominance among elements was dierent. This means that the
parts of any thing are included in every thing into which it turns and
transforms itself, and at the same time that every thing preserves the
traces of the parts of any of the preceding things to whose elements it
keeps on being related although it realizes them in a new balance. This
system of dynamic relations can explain such natural processes as the
formation and the development of biological individuals.13 From this
specic point of view, these phenomena might be understood as com-
plex forms of transformations and becoming by means of the motion
that is imparted by the nous to the original mixture (summixis). This
kind of nous and his function in the dynamic cosmology of Anaxagoras
will be the topic addressed in the next section.
2. The Nous and the a-teleological motion of the cosmos
The following questions are now in order: what is the nous?; which
role does it play in Anaxagoras’ philosophy of nature as it is construed
in this paper?
I am aware of the somewhat equivocal nature of the concept of
nous, which can be easily identied with a divine, metaphysical prin-
ciple. I think it is appropriate to assess whether the divine nature,
which is presumed to characterize Anaxagoras’ nous, can be justied
as one of its original features or instead acknowledged as a feature
11. Cf. Fr. 8DK
12. Cf. Fr. 6DK.
13. Cf. Guthrie 1965; Furley 2002.
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that was superimposed on it later, in particular by the well-known
interpretations given by Plato and Aristotle.
In the fragment no. 12DK, Anaxagoras denes the nous as “the
nest of all things and the purest”. Earlier in the same fragment, the
nous is claimed to be self-ruling. Maybe the description of the nous
as something which is self-ruling and mixed with no other thing is
likely to have induced Plato’s Socrates to believe that the nous is a
metaphysical principle, an immaterial mind that is also relevant to
ethics because it is able to cause everything for the best.14
However, Socrates himself admits that this wonderful hope got
more and more distant till it shattered as he carried on reading Ana-
xagoras’ treatise15 in which the nous did not have the seeming of a
metaphysical principle, that is the transcendent cause of the order of
things in the world, because everything found out its explanatory rea-
son in the material ingredients of the original mixture and in the ways
of their combinations by means of the motion that is caused by the nous.
Apart from the failed attempt at making the nous something divine and
metaphysical,16 Plato’s criticism brings maybe to the fore an improper
use of language of the term nous. By this term, Anaxagoras refers to
something that can be said a principle only in the sense that it puts
the original mixture in motion. The material ingredients of the cosmos
dispose themselves in various arrangements through motion according
to the role they play in relation to one another giving thus shape to
manifold dierent natural composites.17 As Plato’s disappointment
attests, hence, Anaxagoras suggests a rationalistic governing principle,
which is free from the mythical or theological characteristics of prior
cosmogonies, but also from the metaphysics and the teleologism of the
platonic-aristotelic tradition.
14. Cf. Plato, Phaedo, 97c-98b.
15. Cf. Ivi, 98 b-c.
16. Most idealistic and spiritualistic interpretations of the nous in Anaxagoras’
thought derive from Plato’s interpretation such as that proposed by Zeller. Zeller
claims that the explanation of the generation of the world by means of the spermata
requires the action of an ordering and driving force, which Anaxagoras would identify
with the Thinking Being, the Spirit. Cf. Zeller e Mondolfo 1969; Calvetti 1950,
438.
17. Cf. Gomperz 1896-1909.
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Actually, Aristotle’s judgment on Anaxagoras is critical. The Sta-
girite claims that Anaxagoras introduced the nous as an inconsistent
mechanical means to yield order in the universe, that is as an unmoti-
vated expedient deus ex machina.18 Aristotle did not seem to accept
that Anaxagoras’ nous can be only an ecient cause that is devoid
of any teleological character. Both Plato and Aristotle expected to
nd in Anaxagoras not only a description of how the cosmos origi-
nated (ecient cause), rather the explanation of the reason and the
purpose for which the cosmos originated (teleological cause). Instead,
Anaxagoras seems to restrict himself to a mechanistic explanatory
principle without admitting of a mind that moves the world causing
everything for the best. From this standpoint, therefore, the fact that
Anaxagoras’ nous has not a teleological nature, that which would be
something negative for a platonic-aristotelic interpretation,19 is instead
perfectly consistent with the cosmology that has been now attributed
to Anaxagoras.
In the fragment no. 13DK, Anaxagoras maintains that the nous
inaugurates the motion (kinein), and from what is set in motion by it
the dissociation begins which leads to the shaping of all things that
are mixtures. Hence, the nous is what the distinction stems from and
what imparts the motion, the rotation to the original summixis as
undierentiated mass of a multitude of spermata.
In the aforementioned fragment no. 12DK, the nous is described
as what controls the rotation, that is of what comprehends anything
altogether. The rotation is what causes the process of the distinction
and accordingly of the shaping of things to obtain.
Accordingly, the nous and the original summixis are not in oppo-
sition to each other in such a way that they would cancel each other
out. On the contrary, the nous preserves the manifold and pluralistic
nature of the summixis, since the motion it imparts, by means of which
18. Cf. Aristotle, Metaph., I, 4, 985a 18-23.
19. As far as this issue is concerned, Zeller claims that although Anaxagoras
greets the nous the role of the cause of the becoming, the attribution of this role is
incomplete because the teleological interpretation of nature falls within the scope
of the mechanistic one (Cf. Zeller e Mondolfo 1969, 388). Paul Tannery submits
too a negative construal of the nous as mechanistic causality (Cf. Tannery 1886,
255). Giorgio Galli held also that the limitation of Anaxagoras’ position is the missed
discovery of teleology (Cf. Galli 1984, 314 f.).
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the distinction and separation obtain, does not eliminate the spermata,
rather it changes them into the ingredients everything is composed
of. Therefore, the nous and the summixis belong to the same unique
cosmos. They are neither opposite nor irreconcilable. In fact, they
represent the diversity that lies inside the natural world.
According to this interpretation, the manifold nature of the world
is allowed for because it does not depend only on the motion, whose
physical cause is the nous, but also on the original summixis that any
motion is bound to imply. Furthermore, it becomes more understanda-
ble the reason that justies Anaxagoras’ claim that nothing achieves
an ultimate shape and that things never reach out a nal stage of
separation. The motion caused by the nous changes the mixture of
elements into a continuous process of mixing and separation that does
not obtain once and for all, because it is rather carried ceaselessly on.
Though being the purest and most subtle among the things, the
nous is still a thing (krema) which belongs to the nature. Anaxagoras
claims it to be apeiron and autokrates, that is unlimited and self-ruling.
Anaxagoras seems thus to arm both the immanent character of the
nous, its being part of the natural world, and the fact that, although
the nous is a thing, it is dierent from what it moves as well as from
those composites which are shaped just by means of this motion.20
The apeiron and autonomy, which Anaxagoras ascribes to the nous,
are the features that show its unpredictability, indeterminateness and
arbitrariness with respect to the possibility that men have to dene it
in a teleological view
It can be likely conjectured that Anaxagoras reasoned naively that
were the nous mixed with the other things, it would have lost the
independence, which is requested to obtain a clear understanding of
the whole process. Consequently, he describes the nous as something
that is distinguished from what it puts in motion. But at the same
time, Anaxagoras cannot go beyond that, because his materialistic
and pluralistic view does not allow him to understand the nous as a
transcendental metaphysical principle that is teleologically driven, as
instead Plato would have rather had it.
20. Cf. Fr. 12DK. As to this issue, I agree with those interpretations that consider
Anaxagoras’ nous more as a special type of material stu than as an immaterial
substance. Cf., for example, Barnes 1996, 407-408.
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Finally, I think that it is reasonable to conclude that a fair amount
of ambiguity can be indeed detected in Anaxagoras’ concept of the nous
which is somehow aected by a philosophical weakness, but also that
this remark is not a sucient justication to undermine the pluralistic
ontology that Anaxagoras put forth in such an innovative way – as
I tried to show above – or to invalidate the completely ateleological
character of the motion that is imparted by the nous to the original
elements of the summixis.21
The motion caused by the nous, which characterizes every thing
in nature, can be qualied as not teleologically determined, because
the nous is imperishable, as much as all the matter is, and that which
is set in motion by the nous never gets an ultimate shape, rather it
keeps continuously on mixing and separating. In connection with
Anaxagoras’ explanation of the formation of world as it is structured in
ever changing composites, the nous stands out as a mere ecient cause
that triggers a complex motion made of composition and dissociation,
mixture and separation, which is as eternal as the cosmos. Therefore, I
contend that the essential role in the pluralistic ontology of Anaxagoras
is not played by the nous rather by the motion that the nous imparts
to the original matter. Only to this extent, this claim can conform
to Aristotle’s denition of the nous as an expedient deus ex machina,
which is not divine and transcendent since it initiates mechanistically
a motion that is not teleologically driven.22
This motion amounts to the eternal becoming of the original mix-
ture through the composition and dissociation of the ingredients (sper-
mata), which combine and separate continuously with one another
giving thus rise to the dierent things in the world.
Claudia Rosciglione
21. According to this interpretation one should go beyond the dualism between
those who suggest a theistic and metaphysical nature of the nous and, on the other
hand, those who support the thoroughly materialistic view. Among the former, Guthrie
who is certain about the divine nature of the nous, Calogero who holds the absolute
purity of Anaxagoras’ Intellect, and Gigon, who regards the nous as a principle
antithetic to the matter, are worth mentioning (cf. Guthrie 1965, 279; Calogero
1967; Gigon 1936, 40). Among the latter, one may cite Burnet, who regards the nous
as the material motor principle (Cf. Burnet 1920, 267 f.).
22. Cf. Gomperz 1896-1909.
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